This article is a collaboration between Cosive’s CTO, Chris Horsley, and Tash Postolovski.
The traditional response to a phishing attack is to issue a take-down request and wait for the site to (possibly) be yanked offline.
The biggest problem with this method is that, according to IBM researchers, on average, 70% of the credentials harvested during a phishing attack are collected within the first hour. By the time most phishing websites are taken offline they have already delivered their stolen data payload to the criminals operating them. Take-downs, while necessary, just don’t hit phishers where it hurts.
In light of this, security teams are looking for new anti phishing techniques to fight back against phishers. Rather than be reactive, we want to disrupt phishers’ operations. A strategy rapidly gaining in popularity is the use of credential poisoning techniques, utilising what are referred to as ‘canary credentials’.
A canary credential is a fake set of credentials (e.g. username and password) designed to be indistinguishable from legitimate credentials to the untrained eye. If you ever see these credentials used anywhere, it’s a signal that someone is up to no good - the proverbial canary in the coal mine.
These canary credentials mix in with the real credentials harvested by a phisher in the same way that marked money mixes in with unmarked cash. By convincing criminals to use these canary credentials to log into your systems in the hope of getting account access, you can fire alerts whenever you see them.
For example, you submit a fake username of “12032452” to a phishing site. You make sure that “12032452” is never assigned to a real customer, and goes on your alerting watchlist. So, if you ever see “12032452” appear in your authentication logs, you know with certainty something bad is happening.
Using this initial analysis foothold, you can profile their remote connection, their behaviour, or their web browser. This profile of the attacker can lead you to other malicious activities they are performing in your system, like logging into actual compromised user accounts.
In this article, we’re going to be talking specifically about phishing against your customers. Canary credentials for phishing against your staff has its own considerations which we’ll talk about another time.
When your anti phishing team receives a copy of a phishing email, poisoning the phishing site would normally involve visiting the URL and manually entering canary credential data. The data you submit must be credible and believable enough that the attacker is going to accept it and use it without reservation.
Junk data won’t cut it. Do it right or don’t do it at all. When we locate and review the credential logs of phishing sites, we often see people manually entering junk data in an effort to annoy phishers. They might submit twenty credentials to the phishing site, but they are all clearly rubbish, containing things like “Haha, I’m on to you!”.
What these people don’t realise is that, increasingly, phishing sites are automatically validating the data that is given to them. The validations check things like the following, and throw out any credentials that match these rules:
Looking through phishing site credential logs, we see junk credentials immediately marked as ‘invalid’ and discarded automatically. By attempting to poison phishing sites with anti phishing junk data you may instead magnify the negative impacts of the phishing attack by just wasting your own valuable time. If phishers can easily pick out your data as being fake, they’ll never try your credentials. You’ll never see the canary credential appear in your system, and your alert will never fire. The whole anti phishing exercise will be rather pointless.
We have seen multiple instances where phishers, suspicious of activity from a particular IP, respond by putting that IP or its network range on a blacklist that gives your monitoring scripts the false impression that the phishing site has been taken offline. Most commonly, this would be a fake 404 HTTP status code returned by the phishing kit. Your anti phishing team monitoring a phishing URL may be left thinking it has been taken down, when it is actually still impacting your customers.
A careless response to poisoning phishing websites is, in many ways, worse than no response at all.
Ultimately, canary credentials are only worth using as part of your anti phishing strategy if you’re going to use them well. There’s an art to doing that, and some careful forethought required.
The main principle at work here is: don’t be predictable. Don’t leave obvious signatures.
If you don’t want to invest a lot of effort into realistically faking data, or don’t want to use anti phishing software to do this for you, we recommend poisoning phishing sites with a single canary credential. This makes it difficult for phishers to observe patterns in your faked data, even if the fake data is imperfect. If the phisher tries logging in with all the credentials they harvest on your website, you’ll still get an alert whenever they use the canary credential. The downside of the single credential method is that the quality of the phisher’s overall credential harvest is, for the most part, undamaged. Phishing attackers are still reaping the rewards of targeting your organisation, though at least now you have a way to profile and detect them with your canary credential.
To do poisoning at scale, automation is essential, and something we do every day at Cosive with our Phishfeeder anti phishing software.
In Part 2, we look at how to automate submission of canary credentials, and how you can orchestrate your anti phishing response when you detect their use.
Credits
Canary by Olena Panasovska from the Noun Project
Alert by Wolf Lupus from the Noun Project